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This essay examines the questions raised by the present financial crisis through 
an enquiry into the institutional foundations of American finance. We view with 
some skepticism strong claims concerning the disastrous outcome for the 
structural dynamism of the global financial system and America's position in it. 
Many critical political economists tend to take the system of global financial 
markets as their point of departure and then locate the US in this system. Such 
approaches, however, generally fail to do justice to the decades-long build up of 
US financial power and do not capture many of the organic institutional linkages 
through which the American state is connected to the world of global finance and 
which are responsible for its imperial sprawl. In many ways, financial 
globalization is not best understood as the re-emergence of international finance 
but rather as a process through which the expansionary dynamics of American 
finance took on global dimensions. Because the present system of global finance 
has been shaped so profoundly by specifically American institutions and 
practices, it will not do to evaluate the changes and transformations of this 
system on the basis of either an abstract, generic model of capitalism or mere 
extrapolations from conjunctural crises. Crisis and instability are part and parcel 
of the dynamics of imperial finance and so are the managerial capacities 
developed by the US state. The most important questions that should occupy 
critical political economists therefore have to do not with what appear to be 
external challenges to US financial power (or the putative opportunities for 
progressive change opened up by them), but rather relate to the ways in which 
the imperial network of intricate, complex and often opaque institutional linkages 
between the US state and global finance is managed and reproduced. 
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The current crisis has exposed some key networks of the central nervous system 
of global finance. Lending by commercial banks and mortgage providers has 
come to a halt and even the operations of hedge funds and private equity funds – 
until recently seen to be operating in a rarefied world of high finance largely 
unaffected by events in the real world – have been brought up short. In addition, 
such contradictions have been transmitted across the world with unprecedented 
speed. The crisis of the British mortgage bank Northern Rock in the summer of 
2007, while very much a product of integrated global financial markets, produced 
images (replicated a year later with the failure of the IndyMac bank in Southern 
California) that negated pretty much everything that modern people have come to 
believe about the credibility of money and the seemingly autonomous operations 
of the financial system. The pictures of long lines of people waiting to empty their 
bank accounts were reminiscent of the bank failures of the Great Depression and 
peculiarly disconnected from the modern twenty-first-century financial system 
with its highly sophisticated techniques for risk and liquidity management. 
 
Moreover, this crisis has emanated from the heart of empire – unlike the crises 
during the previous decade (such as the Mexican, Asian, Russian and 
Argentinian ones), which seemed bound up primarily with the inability of 
developing countries or emerging markets to shoulder the discipline needed to 
participate in a fully liberalized world order. Other crises – such as the LTCM 
crisis – played themselves out entirely at the level of high finance. The end of the 
dot-com boom and the stock market run-up it sustained already had a serious 
impact on the value of Americans’ investment portfolios. But it is the subprime 
crisis that has really exposed the connections between such a key component of 
the American dream as home ownership and the mechanisms of financial 
expansion and innovation. To many, the situation is yet another illustration of the 
fundamentally unsustainable nature of the neoliberal system of Americanized 
global finance, reliant as it is on massive mountains of virtual money and paper-
debt created through financial engineering and speculative practices that appear 
so disproportionate in relation to the wealth-generating capacity and 
manufacturing competitiveness of the US economy.2  
 
But the present system of global finance has been shaped so profoundly by 
specifically American institutions and practices that it will not do to evaluate the 
changes and transformations of this system on the basis of either an abstract, 
generic model of capitalism or mere extrapolations from conjunctural crises. 
American financial power did not latch on to an existing system of international 
finance but shaped this system to its core through a long history of imperial 
expansion. The decades-long build up of American power has been punctuated 
by multiple crises and instabilities, but this has primarily been a reflection of the 
depth of the transformation effected and the dynamism generated by American-
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style financial globalization. Crisis and instability are part and parcel of the 
dynamics of imperial finance and so are the difficulties experienced by the US 
state in managing them.3 Neither the crisis nor the managerial difficulties are 
likely to prove fatal unless they generate the kinds of social and political conflicts 
that shake the system at its core.  
 
All too often, and with especially good reason at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, it is US military interventions that draw attention to the imperial nature of 
the American state. Yet the proper measure of American empire today needs to 
include the quotidian ways US power is embedded in and operates through the 
structures of global finance, and the central role it has played in the expansion of 
international financial markets and in managing the economic crises that 
emanate from them. While the US position in the international financial system 
has become a key pillar of modern-day American empire, the institutional 
connections between the American state and finance have not received as much 
as attention as they deserve, and as a result the concrete mechanisms through 
which US power operates in this arena still stand in need of considerable 
clarification.  
 
1. CHIEF OF THE FIRE DEPARTMENT. 
 
Just as George W. Bush had criticized the Clinton administration during the 2000 
election campaign for its proclivity for military interventions in far-flung parts of 
the world of places of which he had never heard, so did the new Treasury 
Secretary appointed after the election, Paul O’Neill, openly criticize his 
predecessor’s interventions during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. ‘He called 
me “chief of the fire department”’, Robert Rubin recounted in his memoir, In an 
Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Washington to Wall Street. ‘I liked Paul. I 
didn’t even mind him calling me chief of the fire department. But as I read the 
story, I said to myself: They say they won’t intervene. But they will.’4 As Rubin 
was only too happy to point out, once ‘facing the messy reality of global financial 
crises’ starting in 2001 with Turkey and Argentina, the Bush administration did 
intervene – although, with tensions within the IMF rather less difficult to manage 
than tensions in the UN, they were rather less inclined to be unilateralist in this 
facet of the exercise of American imperial power.   
 
As the turmoil in international financial markets began in the summer of 2007, 
every movement in a vast array of financial markets was closely scrutinized by 
US Treasury staff massed in front of their flat-screen monitors in the ‘markets 
room’. On August 10th, The New York Times reported, Secretary Henry M. 
Paulson Jr., having ‘spent the day in hourly contact with the Fed, other officials in 
the administration, finance ministries and regulators overseas and people on 
Wall Street – where until last year he had worked as an executive at Goldman 
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Sachs’, orchestrated a coordinated international infusion of liquidity to the tune of 
hundreds of billions of dollars. Meanwhile, the staff at the Federal Reserve - 
where the newly appointed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke could draw on his 
academic work as an economist at Princeton University in the 1980s on how the 
1929 crash could have been prevented5 - were in contact with the European 
Central Bank, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan as to the role they 
would play as ‘lenders of last resort’.  
 
Over the ensuing months, the US Treasury would organize, first, a consortium of 
international banks and investment funds, and then an overlapping consortium of 
mortgage companies, financial securitizers and investment funds, to try to get 
them to take concrete measures to calm the markets; and officials in the Federal 
Reserve would stay in close touch with their counterparts in the other central 
banks in deciding what they would each do about interest rates in face of the 
ongoing credit crisis. Both the Treasury and Federal Reserve staff also worked 
closely with the Securities Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission under the rubric of the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets, which since 1988 had overseen such crisis interventions 
inside the American state. At the same time, they burnished their close contacts, 
developed over some three decades of coordinated promotion of both financial 
globalization and crisis management, with the finance ministries and central 
bankers of the G7, and with those of the twenty-six states organized under the 
Financial Stability Forum since 1999, in order (as the latter put it in October 
2007) ‘to enhance market discipline and institutional resilience’.  
 
As the crisis wore on to the end of the year, the central banks of the advanced 
capitalist states undertook a further highly coordinated provision of liquidity to 
sustain the interbank market, while the sovereign wealth funds of other states 
were encouraged to invest directly in Wall Street banks to beef up their capital. 
And as 2008 began with stock markets in Asia and Europe shaken at the 
prospect of an American recession, the US Federal Reserve undertook a large 
emergency cut in interest rates before the New York stock exchange could follow 
suit. Insofar as this might have caused a vicious downward spiral in world stock 
markets, the Fed was acting as much as what The Economist three years before 
had called ‘the world’s central bank’ as the American.6 By March the Fed had 
undertaken another coordinated move with the other central banks, supplying 
them with dollars to provide liquidity to their banks, while simultaneously making 
hundreds of billion dollars more available to Wall Street’s investment banks.  
 
Yet even this could not save one of these – Bear Stearns, ironically the lone 
major investment bank which had refused to cooperate with the Fed-engineered 
bailout of Long Term Capital Management a decade before. When Wall Street 
woke up on St. Patrick’s Day, greeted by headlines like ‘Wall Street quakes as 
the parade passes by’, it was revealed that after all day and night weekend 
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sessions – not dissimilar to when in 1998 the Fed had locked the principals of 
New York investment houses in a hotel room until they jointly agreed to bail out 
LTCM – the Fed had directed, overseen and guaranteed to the tune of $30 billion 
J.P Morgan Chase’s takeover of Bear Stearns.  
 
It was thus hardly surprising that, by the end of the month, when the Treasury 
issued its long-awaited ‘Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory 
Structure’ (in preparation since March 2007, before the onset of the crisis), it was 
primarily designed to ‘enhance’ the Fed’s regulatory authority over the whole 
financial system, not least over the investment banks for whom it now was so 
openly the lender of last resort. Nor was it surprising that the US and British 
Treasuries announced at the same time that plans were afoot to form a working 
group of their respective officials to regularize the coordination of interventions to 
stabilize London and New York’s intertwined financial markets in which they had 
informally been engaged for decades. It might be said that the President’s 
Working Group on Financial Markets, for some 20 years euphemistically dubbed 
the ‘Plunge Protection Team’ by market insiders, was spreading its remit in face 
of the crisis of 2007-8, both domestically and internationally. 
 
2. LINEAGES OF US FINANCIAL POWER. 
 
Many accounts of US financial power take the world of global finance and its 
dramatic expansion since the 1970s as their point of departure and then try to 
locate the US state within this system.7 But such an approach fails to do justice 
to the gradual, decades-long build-up of America’s financial power. The roots of 
the highly distinctive institutions and forms of US finance stem in large part from 
the fact that America’s financial engagement with the world was preceded by a 
long period of domestic, inward development.8 This point should not be 
overstated of course, in light of the international dimensions of American 
development, all the way from the connections between British and American 
merchants based on transatlantic trade, to the use of dollar diplomacy in Latin 
America to open up new economies for American exports and investment in the 
early twentieth century, to the involvement of American bankers in the financing 
of Germany’s post-First World War reparation payments as well as the American 
FDI that flowed into Europe by the 1920s. But it is important to recognize how 
even these externalizations of US finance were accompanied by a series of 
internalizations whereby foreign systems and credit relations were sucked into 
the American financial system. This included the way the inflows of financial 
capital that helped to finance industrialization and railroad construction during the 
nineteenth century were both employed and transformed by the distinctive 
domestic dynamics of class and state formation in the US. This determined that 
at the same time as Britain was at the high point of its international power during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States was able to 
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engage in a process of relatively autonomous and unprecedented continental 
expansion. 
 
One key factor in this process of internal development was the role of farmers: 
unlike pre-modern European farmers, American yeoman farmers were closely 
connected to market relations and as a result financial relations and institutions 
proliferated rapidly. But farmers’ financial demands were specific to their socio-
economic position: their need for mortgage credit and populist fears of financial 
concentration clashed with attempts by mercantile and financial elites to model 
America’s financial system on the British system (based on short-term, trade-
related credit and supported by a central bank functioning as lender of last 
resort), and as a result the antebellum US financial system often failed to 
generate sufficient liquidity for banks to be able to function properly. Thus, 
whereas in Europe the development of finance was seen as removed from daily 
life and divorced from social struggles (haute finance), in the US, political 
contestations articulated class and finance from the very beginning, and this has 
had a lasting impact on the nature of America’s financial institutions.9 Precisely 
because American financial institutions were so hotly contested they ended up 
incorporating a much wider variety of interests. 
 
The state’s role in constituting financial markets, especially from the time of the 
Civil War onwards, was crucial in turning this into a strength rather than a 
weakness of US finance. In order to help fund war debts, the Northern 
government created a national banking system that served to centralize funds 
from all over the country in New York banks, which were faced with a scarcity of 
liquid assets and had great difficulty investing their funds. This set in motion a 
veritable transformation of the mechanisms of financial intermediation that had 
emerged with the growth of commerce in sixteenth-century Europe and then 
developed with the industrialization and commercialization of England. The 
defeat of a stagnating system of hyper-exploitation in the American South (which 
had been highly compatible with the existing system of transatlantic financial 
linkages under British hegemony) required and promoted the development of a 
more coherent, centralized system of financial practices and institutions. 
American banks after the Civil War turned away from classical commercial and 
mercantile banking and towards what by the turn of the twentieth century was 
already identified as a distinctive form of ‘financial banking’,10 based on the 
investment of funds in the stock market and other speculative markets through 
which American banks had invented new ways to create and access liquidity.11 
 
The direct borrowing and lending through the trading of financial instruments 
which remains to this day the hallmark of the American financial system can in 
part also be seen to result more directly from farmers’ continuing engagement 
with financial institutions in the post-Civil War era. The institutions created to 
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organize and run agricultural commodities exchanges over time became so 
sophisticated and diversified that they would eventually give birth to today’s 
massive financial derivates markets. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the 
world’s central futures market in livestock long after the slaughterhouses were 
gone from Chicago, invented the futures market in currencies after the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates; and the Chicago Board of 
Trade, the world’s centre of futures trading in wheat, corn and soya long after 
grain was no longer stored in Chicago, soon followed by launching the futures 
markets in US Treasury securities. As the head of the CME, Leo Melamed (who 
initiated the process in 1971 with the help of Milton Friedman) put it: ‘without the 
cadre of traders who left the known risks of the cattle, hog and pork belly pits for 
the unknown dangers of foreign exchange . . . [the financial futures revolution] 
could not have been implemented’.12 
 
3. NOT ‘FINANCE CAPITAL’. 
 
The fact that the new system of financial intermediation established in the US in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century was highly market-based and 
characterized by a self-reinforcing dynamic of speculative expansion also gave 
rise to a relationship between finance and industry that was rather different from 
the one that prevailed in Europe. The extraordinary growth of the American 
domestic market propelled a wave of mergers that was responsible for a 
tremendous and lasting concentration and centralization of capital.13 Yet the 
result was not a system of uncompetitive ‘monopoly capitalism’:14 the 
increasingly large firms remained intensely competitive with one another within 
the giant domestic market. Key here was the fact that the mergers were financed 
and organized through the institutions that had been built around the stock 
market, which exploded during the years around the turn of the century. To be 
sure, American investment bankers were a key driving force behind these 
developments and the process was accompanied by the growth of interlocking 
directorships across finance and industry. But these bankers were nonetheless 
very different creatures than the German Grossbanken, which were much better 
positioned to take controlling interests in a number of firms, and to function as the 
glue among them. 
  
Hilferding’s theory of ‘finance capital’15 – the institutional combination of industry 
and banking under the dominance of the latter to limit competition – was 
premised on the same developments occurring in the US as in Germany. Yet, in 
the US such a structural restriction of financial competition never solidified. To a 
large extent, this was due to the intense populist hatred of corporate collusion 
and the political clout of the antitrust movement. But by the early twentieth 
century this was backed up by the institutional fact that the relations between 
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industry and finance were based on what was in principle a publicly accessible 
open market. While more direct ways of exercising influence were available, the 
principal relations between finance and industry were mediated by the stock 
market. The role of bankers was first and foremost in handling corporations’ sale 
of their own stocks and bonds to raise capital or take over other firms. The 
concentration of capital thus went hand in hand with intense financial 
competition. In early twentieth-century America, capital accumulation was not 
dependent on the restriction of competition in the financial sector; nor was it still 
primarily dependent on the geographical extension of the domestic market. 
Rather, what became a key source of growth was the deepening of the market – 
a process facilitated and sustained by the very same market-based financial 
institutions and practices that prevented a German-style organized capitalism. 
 
With the defeat of the late nineteenth-century challenges that had emerged from 
what was then the most industrially militant working class in the capitalist world 
as well as from the radicalized farmers’ populist movement, US capitalism 
entered the twentieth century demonstrating a remarkable capacity to integrate 
and subsume small business, professionals, middle-class strata and working-
class consumers.16 On this basis, the US developed the industrial innovations 
that became identified by the first decade of the twentieth century with Taylorism 
and Fordism – both of which reorganized mass production so as to make a high-
wage proletariat functional to industrial capitalism. These organizational changes 
were not confined to the organization of the corporation and the workplace but 
penetrated the household and personal lifestyle. By the late 1920s one in five 
Americans owned a car, and 60 per cent of these cars were bought on instalment 
credit. Edwin Seligman’s The Economics of Installment Selling in 1927 captured 
the ethos of Fordism in the new mass consumer age. He extolled credit-based 
marketing for increasing ‘not only consumers’ capacity to save but also the desire 
to save’; indeed, ‘[t]he family with car payments to make would be forced to work 
hard to make the payments’.17 This was crucial in the overall explosion in 
demand for consumer durables that transformed the retail sector with the aid of a 
massive advertising industry, whose expenditures at the end of the 1920s were 
five times what they had been pre-World War One.  
 
The specificities of American finance’s engagement with labour, capital and the 
state were such as to give rise to an unprecedented expansion of the financial 
system. The rise of consumerism, the corporate revolution in American industry 
and the exponential increase in government expenditure (induced by war and the 
regulatory imperatives created by an industrializing society alike) fuelled a 
demand for credit and financial services that banks and other intermediaries 
were in an excellent position to meet. The federal government was both market 
participant and regulator in this process. The constitutive relation between state 
and financial markets was especially seen in the creation of the Federal Reserve 
as an attempt to manage the expansionary but volatile dynamics of the financial 
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system.18 While it would take the better part of the century for the Federal 
Reserve to become the uniquely powerful actor that it is today, from the 
beginning it changed the institutional configuration of American finance – not 
least by amplifying the power of the Treasury far beyond the role of the 
government’s bookkeeper and fundraiser. With the Federal Reserve’s policy 
instruments enlisted in the service of the Treasury’s funding operations, the 
dramatic growth of government debt over the course of the twentieth century 
gave domestic US financial markets a huge boost. While economists tend to 
think of government borrowing in terms of its tendency to ‘crowd out’ private 
financial activity and lending, in the US the financial operations of the 
government have always been a key element in the expansion of financial 
markets at large.  
 
This meant that as the twentieth century progressed it saw the construction of an 
ever denser network of organic, even if also contradictory and conflictual, 
institutional linkages between the American state and financial markets. The 
institutional configuration of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury with private 
financial intermediaries was crucial in this regard. This is not say that this 
relationship was a stabilizing one for the economy – as was abundantly proved 
with the 1929 crash. The Federal Reserve and Treasury’s aggravation of its 
consequences significantly contributed to the Great Depression both in the US 
and internationally. 
 
4. THE NEW DEAL ERA. 
 
The New Deal’s stabilizing financial reforms, even while emerging out of the 
class conflict that resulted from working-class mobilization in the wake of the 
disappointment of their expectations fostered by ‘the American dream’, once 
again showed the intricate interplay between class and finance in the US. The 
New Deal was marked by the idea that the expansionary dynamics of American 
finance needed to be actively managed, rather than suppressed. It put limits on 
competition and speculation, but the objective and effects of this were not the 
general suppression of finance but precisely the fortification of key financial 
institutions and so an enhanced capacity to regulate the dynamics of expansion.  
 
American finance in the early twentieth century was characterized by highly 
expansionary and poorly regulated dynamics: instability and the concentration of 
financial power were widely seen as a consequence of financiers’ ability to 
gamble recklessly with massive amounts of ‘other people’s money’ (in the phrase 
used by progressive lawyer Louis Brandeis).19 The Pujo Congressional 
Committee was charged with investigating the practices of what had become 
known as the ‘New York Money Trust’. Generating great public interest, it 
uncovered monopolistic practices, a high degree of concentration, a web of 
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interlocking directorates and outright corruption. A couple of decades later, after 
the Federal Reserve had proved itself incapable of balancing the dynamics of 
American finance and curbing its excesses, the Pecora Congressional 
Committee uncovered a range of shady financial practices and connections. 
Indeed, Wall Street bankers’ intimate relations with the New York branch of the 
Federal Reserve System seemed to work primarily to further their own interests. 
Nor did the revelation that J.P. Morgan’s son Jack had not paid any income tax 
during the two preceding years do much to improve the public’s opinion of New 
York financiers’ moral character. 
 
But the New Deal reforms did as much to protect the financial services sector 
from these popular sentiments as they responded to democratic pressures for 
reform. The regulatory system that was imposed after the New Deal made the 
financial services sector much more transparent and accountable, but this 
increased accountability was organized through bodies representing financial 
capital’s various sectional interests. The New Deal restrained competition and 
the excesses of speculation not so much by curbing the power commanded by 
finance but rather by promoting professional self-regulation and vesting private 
actors with quasi-public authority. In this way, self-regulation became a means to 
not merely shield financial markets from democracy but to make it positively 
serviceable to them. That is, the New Deal legislation and regulations reassured 
the American public that technical matters were now in safe, professional 
hands,20 and this faith was an important factor driving the growth in public 
participation in financial markets. 
 
Thus, while the New Deal was certainly a progressive response to social 
instability and discontent, it should not be conceptualized primarily in terms of the 
Polanyian re-embedding or social-democratization of American capitalism.21 
Indeed, the New Deal reforms were oriented towards promoting (rather than 
reducing) the working classes’ integration into and dependence on the financial 
system. This was most conspicuous in – but by no means limited to – the 
creation of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), charged 
with securing the availability of cheap mortgage credit through the securitization 
of mortgage loans. Together with the expansion of government debt and 
corporate debt during the 1930s, this meant that American finance was in full 
motion by the time the Second World War started. Moreover, the war itself gave 
a huge further boost to these dynamics. 
 
The New Deal was in turn crucial to the nature of the imperial project embodied 
in the post-Second World War US state. We can only fully understand the 
dynamics of post-war international finance – including the nature of the neoliberal 
era – if we have a proper understanding of the transformation of the American 
state during the New Deal and the war – which was far more complex than can 
be captured in conceptualizations of states and markets as external to one 
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another and requires an understanding of some of the basic historical features 
and dynamics of the American financial system. The wartime American state, 
strengthened by the capacities it had developed through the New Deal, 
effectively rewrote the rules of global finance as part of its planning for the post-
war world. Insofar as the Treasury’s Keynesian economists took the lead here, 
this involved no little tension with Wall Street. But the compromises that 
emerged, even in the Bretton Woods agreement itself, let alone its subsequent 
application, need to be understood in the context of what the New Dealers 
themselves called the overall ‘grand truce’ with business.22 A resilient US 
financial capital was not external to the constitution of the post-war Bretton 
Woods order: it was embedded within it and determined its particular character. 
 
This crucial dimension of the reconstruction of the international financial order 
after the Second World War has received too little attention. The notion of 
‘embedded liberalism’23 in particular fails to capture what made these market 
structures and institutions qualitatively different from those that had prevailed 
during the previous wave of globalization under British hegemony. Moreover, 
embedded liberalism has served as the foundation of an overly-stylized 
periodization of the half century after the Second World War into two highly 
distinct orders, as if the Bretton Woods era and the era of neoliberal globalization 
had nothing in common.24 Linking the two eras was the evolution of the American 
informal empire and the development of financial capital under its aegis. With the 
system of private international payments largely defunct, the US used 
governmental capital flows outside the Bretton Woods system as a lever to 
influence the European pattern of post-war reconstruction. Thus, during the first 
years after the Second World War the penetration of European economies by US 
capital worked primarily through the institutions of the nation-state: the diffusion 
of American imperial power occurred through the internationalization of national 
states.  
 
The political economy literature has always taken the prominent role of the 
national state in the immediate post-Second World War period as evidence of the 
limits to economic and financial globalization.25 But it is much more accurately 
viewed as indicating a particular form of imperial globalization. National 
economies and capitalist elites depended to an ever greater degree on states 
whose key institutions and capabilities had already been internationalized and 
whose functions were profoundly imbricated with the reproduction of American 
empire.26 In other words, internationalization should not be opposed to the 
Fordist model of nationally oriented development; instead, it occurred to a 
significant degree through that model. 
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If the ‘liberal’ aspect of the concept of ‘embedded liberalism’ leads to a failure to 
capture important aspects of the internationalization and Americanization of 
European economies, so does the notion of ‘embeddedness’ fail to capture 
important dimensions and sources of American financial power.27 For one thing, 
the dollar was the only convertible currency and New York was the only open 
financial centre, so foreigners wishing to float bonds had little choice but to turn 
to the US. More to the point, however, by the time European counties had 
recovered sufficiently to restore convertibility, the American financial system had 
already gone through almost two decades of domestic financial growth – 
propelled by industrial recovery, heavy government lending and the progressive 
integration of ever more layers of the American population into the financial 
system. The role of the Federal Reserve was crucial in facilitating the expansion 
of credit to keep up with the demand generated by Fordist patterns of 
consumption, production and government spending, further making ordinary 
people not less but more dependent on the capitalist system. 
 
The dramatic post-war expansion of American financial markets effected a 
degree of continental integration hitherto unseen, and this contrasted starkly with 
the situation in Europe until the late 1950s. The origins of the changes that took 
place in Europe from that time on are best understood not so much in terms of 
the sudden re-emergence of ‘global finance’, but rather as part of a process 
through which the dramatic expansion of American finance began to assume 
international dimensions. It was the externalization of American practices and 
institutions that during the 1960s began to transform a conservative system of 
international payments into an integrated system of expansionary financial 
markets. To be sure, the enormous growth and export capacity of the European 
and Japanese economies that the US had sponsored, coincident with military 
expenditures, foreign aid and the outflow of foreign direct investment from 
American MNCs to the European market, began to have contradictory effects on 
the US itself, as a deteriorating US balance of payments produced pressures on 
the dollar.  
 
This became the central issue of international finance during the 1960s, and it 
was notable that even when the Bretton Woods system was finally made 
operative with the return to currency convertibility at the end the 1950s, the IMF 
and World Bank, which had not been able to play much of a role in addressing 
the dollar shortage of the previous period, now found that the new problems 
entirely overwhelmed their capacities. It was the Treasury, the agency principally 
responsible for the external position of the US and for the status of the dollar, 
which now emerged as a central player in international finance.28 This became 
especially significant towards the end of the 1960s as the Treasury became 
increasingly aware that the imbalances created by the deteriorating balance of 
payments and the growing Eurodollar market were not primarily America’s own 
problems, and that the options available to the Europeans and Japanese were 
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very limited. It was in this context that the US broke the dollar’s link with gold, 
and came to recognize that its real challenge was not to fight off imperial 
contenders but precisely to manage the gyrations of an ever more dynamic and 
encompassing financial system with New York as its pivot.29 
 
Many saw the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and 
dollar–gold convertibility as the beginning of a new era of American policy 
irresponsibility and hegemonic decline that could, in the worst-case scenario, 
lead to unbridled economic rivalry and a breakdown of the world economy just as 
it had in the interwar period.30 Such perceptions were reinforced by the fact that 
the American state was indeed increasingly preoccupied in the 1970s with 
questions of domestic economic and financial management.31 It was once again 
the distinctive class relations within the American state that proved especially 
salient in this. The inflationary pressures to which all the capitalist states were 
subject at the time had little prospect of being stifled in the US via the types of 
incomes policies secured through trade union cooperation with social-democratic 
parties in Europe. This left the militancy of a new generation of workers in the US 
relatively unbridled and enabled them to cash in on productivity increases and 
drive up wages in line with rising prices.  
 
This contradiction was aggravated, moreover, by the volatile mixture of financial 
innovation and securitization, as the growth of private pension funds combined 
with the liberalization of financial services, rising interest rates and the 
speculative opportunities offered by floating exchange rates. The savings of 
ordinary people were increasingly invested in mutual funds, and the US 
government used securitization techniques to promote the extension of mortgage 
credit. As the tension between inflation and financial expansion played itself out 
over the course of the 1970s, jeopardizing economic growth and producing 
pressure on the dollar, both industrial and financial capitalist forces within the US 
were increasingly drawn towards policies that entailed a drastic restructuring of 
the American economy of a kind that might bring about a fundamental shift in the 
balance of class forces in their favor. 
 
It was not that they had done badly under the New Deal regime, only that they 
had outgrown it. The fragmentation of the regulatory landscape in the New Dear 
regime had meant that regulatory competition became a crucial promoter of 
financial expansion and the sheer density of semi-public regulatory authority 
meant that institutional reform became a key dimension in strategies of financial 
innovation and the construction of competitive advantage. The postwar 
recuperation and expansion of the American financial system was best viewed 
not as a resurgence of the ‘high finance’ that governed financial globalization 
under British hegemony, but rather as a process of finance coming down to 
earth, marked by the ever deeper penetration of financial relations into new 
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layers of society. These characteristics of the American financial system had 
driven its steady growth from the 1930s to the 1960s. But as the dynamics of 
financial growth began to strain against the New Deal framework by the 1960s, 
this meant that the patterns of hegemonic socialization and integration and the 
ideological mystifications used to justify self-regulation devised with the New 
Deal state came under pressure. The opening up of the financial system also 
meant that, in certain respects, it – and the many problems generated by self-
regulation – became more transparent. New and often powerful financial actors 
raised questions about the functioning of self-regulatory institutions which served 
the interests of older, more established actors, and these new actors began 
publicizing the woes plaguing their competitors and playing up the ‘scandals’ that 
beset the New Deal system as financial activity outside the self-regulatory 
structures continued to grow, and as the institutions of New Deal regulation 
experienced growing difficulty both in performing their technical tasks and their 
ability to keep outsiders out.  
 
This had already come to a head by the late 1960s as the growth of trading 
volume on the NYSE gave rise to the ‘back office crisis’: the NYSE members’ 
offices handling the paperwork were collapsing under their growing workload, 
resulting in the failure of several houses and large financial losses for investors. 
This made it clear that Glass–Steagall did not provide sufficient protection and 
sparked a Congressional investigation that attracted considerable media 
attention and provided the liberalization lobby – spearheaded by pension and 
mutual funds and insurance companies and supported by retail-oriented 
investment firms such as Merrill Lynch – with a forum to make its case. Under 
pressure, the SEC responded with a shift away from its support for the cartel-like 
structures of brokers, investment banks and corporate managers that had 
dominated capital markets for several decades.32 In 1975 the SEC abolished the 
system of fixed-rate brokerage commissions (which had worked to the 
disadvantage of institutional investors).33 In the same year Congress passed 
Amendments to the Securities Acts which strengthened the SEC’s regulatory 
authority by giving it more instruments to intervene in the structures of self-
regulation and to enforce competitive market structures, promote market 
transparency and target insider practices. 
 
The opening up of the securities sector intensified the imperatives of financial 
competition to such an extent that the banks also embarked on a campaign for 
deregulation. And they too could link up with the American ideology of the small 
saver and thus count on considerable popular support to push the programme of 
neoliberal deregulation further than the administrations of the 1970s had wanted 
to go. Reagan’s neoliberal revolution was a prime example of how financial elites 
can channel social discontent into their drive for regulatory change. During the 
1970s, these business interests funded conservative lobby groups and think-
tanks, so fomenting and capitalizing on a popular backlash amongst the white 
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suburban middle and working classes.34 The right’s particular strength was to 
portray economic problems (such as unemployment, high levels of inflation, the 
predicament of the savings and loan sectors and the dangers it posed to the 
home building industry, financial volatility and the declining dollar) as the 
inevitable result of the excessive regulation of the New Deal framework. But 
deregulation was in fact re-regulation. Indeed, the neoliberal programme was 
accompanied by a dramatic enhancement of the US state’s control over financial 
markets. The main piece of legislation was the 1980 Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act: it aimed not only to lighten the burden of 
regulation, but also to re-regulate the system and so to improve the mechanisms 
of monetary control.  
 
5. THE NEOLIBERAL TURN. 
 
While the coalition of forces that came to sustain a protracted period of 
Republican rule in the US was motivated by a broad variety of concerns and 
prejudices, the changes they effected were spearheaded by a dramatic move at 
the seemingly technical level of monetary policy-making. Monetarism as a theory 
had existed for some time, but until the late 1970s it had not been taken very 
seriously by academics and policy-makers. Paul Volcker, appointed by Carter as 
Federal Reserve Chairman to shore up his anti-inflation credibility, saw 
monetarism as offering a useful ideological cover for raising interest rates to a 
level that would break the back of inflationary pressures by changing the balance 
of class forces. This was highly effective in bringing inflation down, but this did 
not happen in classical textbook fashion. The innovation strategies of American 
financial intermediaries trumped attempts to restrict the creation of money and 
credit. Rather, the high interest rates – in combination with the opportunities 
opened up by neoliberal deregulation and trade union concessions and 
repression – meant that financial markets began sucking in economic activity. 
American finance exploded as growing government, corporate and household 
debt were financed by the inflows of massive amounts of funds, most of which 
came from abroad.35 
 
To many political economists, prone as they are to relying on an external 
understanding of the US state vis-à-vis global financial markets, neoliberalism 
and monetarism can only appear as the American state’s admission of weakness 
or, at best, an acceptance of external discipline vis-à-vis international financial 
markets.36 The understanding of neoliberalism and monetarism advanced here, 
by contrast, emphasizes the fact that it reconfigured the institutional parameters 
of American finance in a way that allowed the American state to retain a 
considerable degree of control over financial markets.37 Over the course of the 
post-Second World War period the externalization of American financial practices 
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and institutions had created such a dense network of linkages between global 
financial markets and the American state that the latter possessed an 
extraordinary degree of pulling power – and this remained operative in the course 
of the transition from the Bretton Woods era to the neoliberal era that succeeded 
it. The turn to neoliberalism and monetarism was thus a key moment in the 
constitution of American imperialism.38 
 
The dynamics of the neoliberal era tend to confuse most of the spatial metaphors 
that political economists use to describe processes of imperial integration. Even 
the idea of externalization, which usefully serves to draw our attention to the 
process of Americanization, fails to capture some of the dynamics that emerged 
following the monetarist shock and neoliberal deregulation – which in a sense 
represented the obverse side of such externalization. The post-Volcker shock 
pattern of financial globalization also needs to be understood in terms of a 
renewed and much advanced instance of the process of internalization, as a 
vortex-like process whereby foreign systems and credit relations were pulled into 
the American financial system.39 Externalization, in other words, can create 
conditions that allow for internalization: globalization operates as the extension of 
the constitutive forms of one state and their penetration into other polities and 
economies and so creates a dense network of linkages between global 
processes of socio-economic expansion and the imperial state, and these 
linkages have the effect of heightening the policy leverage enjoyed by the 
imperial state, of increasing its ‘pull’. Moreover, the vortex metaphor suggested 
by the notion of internalization can be used to highlight yet another aspect of the 
specific nature of American empire: the global expansion of American finance 
has not only been shaped by the nature of its domestic institutions, but also 
existed in a relationship of functional interdependence with its internal growth. In 
stark contrast with the case of British hegemony, the international expansion of 
American finance always has been inextricably connected with its domestic 
expansion.  
 
Especially in the neoliberal era, American financial imperialism has functioned by 
drawing in a variety of heterogeneous and geographically dispersed practices 
and relations and concentrating them into a space structured by American rules 
and institutions. This vortex-like quality is what underlies the non-territorial, 
network-like power of American financial imperialism. Of course, ultimately all 
metaphors have limits as guides to understanding and it is important not to 
stretch them beyond what they can accommodate. In particular, none of the 
above is meant to suggest that the turn to neoliberalism did not involve an 
imposition of financial discipline. But this was not a discipline imposed by 
depoliticized international financial markets on the US state, but rather by the US 
state and its ruling coalitions on the American subordinate classes. This was a 
crucial condition for the generalization of such discipline internationally by other 
states and ruling classes in the neoliberal era. 
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The fact that American finance had attained a new degree of hegemony did not 
mean that it had become immune to instability, nor did it mean that the financial 
volatility that came with neoliberalism did not matter to the American state. Even 
if it had solved the problems of inflation and insufficient capital inflows, it was still 
experiencing considerable difficulty in managing the dynamics it had unleashed. 
The debt crisis, the Savings and Loan crisis and ultimately the 1987 crash of the 
stock market raised the question of how destabilizing the consequences of 
accelerating financial expansion would be and threw into doubt the ability of the 
American state to regulate this instability. Moreover, as more and more states 
inserted their economies into the dynamics of financial globalization and opened 
their socio-economic spaces to be structured by American rules and practices, 
this created new sources of instability. For a time it seemed that the US had 
bought some short-term relief from the pressure of global financial markets at the 
expense of its own and the world’s economic health. This was the heyday of 
predictions of imperial decline and many felt that the passing of America’s 
international power to Japan was just a matter of time.40 
 
But such perspectives were rather oblivious to the flexibility that the US state 
displayed in addressing these problems and laying the basis for a regulatory 
regime more appropriate to the new financial dynamics. The Treasury became 
more active not only in opening up but also in regulating financial markets, and it 
did so in close consultation and cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank.41 
Since the demise of Bretton Woods, the IFIs had been redefining their roles and 
by the 1980s were acting as more or less responsible agents of the neoliberal 
project as well as of American imperial power. At home, repeated US 
government interventions and bail-outs amounted to an acknowledgement of the 
US state’s responsibility for the soundness of the financial system and created a 
pattern of stabilizing expectations for the future. It also introduced a major 
element of moral hazard into the system, which promoted more financial 
innovation and risk. The Basel Accord response to this by creating regulatory 
standards for the banks’ risk and liquidity-management strategies sought to 
stabilize global financial markets while reinforcing the structural pro-American 
bias embedded in their legal framework.42 
 
By the early 1990s the expansionary dynamics of American and global finance 
had been consolidated into a regime that possessed more coherence than most 
commentators had imagined possible during the previous decade. Domestically, 
the regulatory fragmentation of the New Deal framework was not so much 
replaced as reproduced with a broad neoliberal remit, overseen by the Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury. Internationally, this regime became known as the 
Washington Consensus, indicating the degree to which the strategies of the IFIs 
were informed by US interests. In most of the major international crises of the 
1990s the US played a key role, partly in bringing on the crisis in the first place, 
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partly in organizing and financing the rescue operations that contained the 
damage, and above all in writing the rules for the restructuring of states and 
economies that followed.43 All this indicated the financial management capacities 
the American state had been able to develop.  
 
Throughout the 1990s, the most serious threats to financial stability under the 
imprint of the Washington Consensus seemed to be external. But by the turn of 
the century, the tendencies to instability were increasingly visible at home as 
well. The stock market had ridden on the internet boom, and the effects of the 
dot-com meltdown ramified through American and international financial markets. 
Critics now charged that the growth of the stock market and the record profits of 
investment banks had been a result of the artificial inflation of asset prices and 
that the growth of consumer debt, typically justified in terms of the wealth effect 
of rising stock market and real estate prices, was also built on quicksand.44 
However, to insist that the dot-com boom amounted to nothing but a massive 
build-up of fictitious capital is to ignore the extent to which financial expansion 
was itself structurally and materially grounded as a key part of the economic 
system. In fact, the speculative functions of American finance increasingly 
became imbricated, not least through the venture capital component of the dot-
com boom, with its more productive roles. Thus, while the bursting of the bubble 
itself represented a major problem, this did not negate the tremendous profits 
that had been made and the opportunities opened up by it, many of which 
continued to play themselves out in other parts of the economic system - not 
least in the housing and mortgage markets. Meanwhile, the continued growth of 
consumer debt had as its very real material basis the dramatic increase in levels 
of inequality over the previous two decades. 
 
6. THE PRESENT CRISIS. 
 
But a new crisis struck in the summer of 2007: the credit crunch that beset global 
financial markets occurred in the wake of a party of speculation, easy consumer 
credit and takeover activity that was spawned by the liquidity that the Federal 
Reserve, in conjunction with other central banks (especially the Japanese), had 
pumped into the system to prevent a recession after the dot-com bubble burst 
and through the post-9/11 political conjuncture. It originated in the subprime 
sector of the American mortgage market and therefore struck at the heart of the 
imperial financial system: the possibility of converting illiquid mortgage loans into 
standardized, easily tradable financial assets has always been crucial in 
improving the ability of American intermediaries to extend mortgage credit. As 
such, it has been a key driving force behind the growth of American finance in 
this decade as well as the ever deeper penetration of financial relations into 
American society – especially as many subprime mortgage lenders found their 
way into poor, largely African-American neighbourhoods that traditionally had 
                                                 
43
 Burke (2001). 
44
 Brenner (2003). 
Konings, Martijn and Panitch, Leo. Global finance in crisis. 
Papeles de Europa 
19 (2009): 29-57 
47 
been of little interest to more established full-service commercial banks.45 Not 
surprisingly – and reflecting the continuing racial inequalities so endemic to 
American society and working-class formation – many of these underlying assets 
turned out to be much less secure than even the rating agencies thought. Given 
how centrally involved American banks had been in the packaging and sale of 
these mortgage securities, and how eager many foreign (especially European) 
banks had been to purchase them, the effects of uncertainty were rapidly 
transmitted through the inter-bank market and the crisis spread rapidly to other 
parts of the global financial system. 
 
This has led many to conclude, once again, that the current situation has 
exposed the shaky foundations of the American financial system, reliant as it is 
on a mountain of virtual money and paper-debt without the real income streams 
and wealth-generating capacity to back it up.46 But such apocalyptic 
assessments of the consequences of the current crisis for the state of imperial 
finance should be viewed with some scepticism. For one thing, investors’ 
response to the liquidity crunch has been a classic ‘flight to quality’: investors’ 
aversion of risk has meant a huge flow of funds to Treasury securities, a virtually 
riskless financial asset that nonetheless yields an income stream. Moreover, the 
effects of the crunch were immediately seen to be quite severe outside the US. 
While several US banks have had to write off significant losses, it was the British 
bank Northern Rock which first had to deal with long lines of people seeking to 
withdraw their savings funds in scenes reminiscent of the Depression era. When 
this scene was repeated almost a year later in California with the IndyMac bank, 
it was taken into public hands with rather less hand-wringing than had occurred 
in the UK. IndyMac was the fifth US depository institution (out of a total of 8,494 
in operation) to fail since the subprime mortgage crisis began but this was a 
remarkably small number in comparison with the thousands of banks that closed 
their doors in the early 1980s or during the savings and loan crisis later that 
decade. Indeed, the impact of the  crisis on the German Landesbanken (regional 
banks charged with overseeing the German system of local savings banks and 
operating with effective public guarantees), which had considerable amounts of 
funds tied up in subprime debt, immediately appeared more serious in 2007 than 
it did on US regional banks. 
 
In a number of important ways, the present crisis affirms the argument made 
here. Most fundamentally, the current situation represents an interruption of 
American capitalism’s ability to functionally integrate ordinary people’s activities 
and aspirations into the financial system, and this has had global as well as 
domestic consequences. Within the US, the crisis has so far been prevented 
from spiralling fully out of control through the extension of a range of - first implicit 
and then explicit - government guarantees to American financial intermediaries. 
And this is where we encounter one of the most striking aspects of the current 
situation: despite considerable popular anger about these Wall Street bailouts, 
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the concern not to impose such conditions on financial capital that might get in 
the way of securing their cooperation in getting the system back on track reflects 
the determining linkages between class and state.  American politicians have 
paid ample lip-service to popular resentment but in this way they also have 
ensured that the more policy-relevant debates have remained largely technical 
and instrumental, focused on what can be done to contain the fallout of the crisis 
and to prevent similar events in the future.' 
 
Notably, when a run on the shares of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac took place in 
the summer of 2008, they had no difficulty with a three billion dollar bond issue 
being snapped up, as investors drew ‘a sharp distinction between the equity and 
the debt on the assumption the debt is implicitly guaranteed by the US 
government.’47 This was not only reinforced by Paulson's announcement that the 
‘liquidity backstops would be there in the shape of a flexible government credit 
line and access to emergency funds from the Federal Reserve’, but also by the 
‘instant impact’ the SEC had as it set out new rules that restricted securities firms 
short-selling the shares of 19 financial firms. The fact that these included, in 
addition to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, such major foreign banks as Barclays, 
Credit Suisse, BNP Paribas and HSBC as well as American ones such as 
Citicorp, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers was indicative 
of the blurring of public and private and domestic and international lines when it 
comes to the American state's role in financial regulation.48   
 
In terms of its international effects, while there is nothing automatic about 
imperial reproduction, the way this crisis is playing out suggests that it will be 
contained within the mechanisms through which American financial empire is 
constructed rather than result in challenges from imperial contenders. The 
hegemonic integration of most layers of the American population into the 
financial system has been a major source of strength for the various institutions 
of American empire. And as long as this pillar, fuelling the mutually reinforcing 
expansion of American finance at home and abroad, remains in place, instability 
will be treated as a problem of imperial management rather than as a deep social 
crisis. It will tend to spark reforms and adjustments but of a kind that are not likely 
to lead to any fundamental realignment of financial power in the capitalist world 
order. Thus, the main upshot of the current situation is that the American state 
finds itself with a peculiar and unanticipated new problem of imperial 
management: a relatively small amount of bad debt has managed to produce 
considerable turmoil in the global financial system because no one seems to 
know who is holding it. Risk, in other words, has been converted into genuine 
uncertainty. While the short-term outlook is grim, viewed from a longer-term 
perspective it is not impossible that this could once again turn out to be a major 
opportunity for financial innovation. This would work to the advantage of those 
firms that are capable of upgrading and overhauling their risk management 
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techniques within a reasonable amount of time, as well as spur the growth of 
largely privatized (and almost exclusively American) mechanisms of credit-rating 
and market governance. Notably, European states have called for a further 
refinement of the Basel II measures, and this would provide the US with an 
outstanding opportunity to reinforce the asymmetrical dynamics of the financial 
system. 
 
It is important to emphasize here that capital inflows into the US are very much 
motivated by the self-interest of foreign investors. It is less useful to see such 
inflows in terms of the latter engaging in some sort of sacrifice to come to the aid 
of a hegemonic power suffering balance of payments problems (which assumes 
an implausible degree of systemic oversight on the part of investors), rather than 
in terms of the concrete mechanisms and institutional linkages through which US 
power is organically embedded in the global economy. The trade deficit that 
caused so many to worry about the sustainability of US power and liberal world 
order since the 1960s constituted a problem for the US state, but the capital 
inflows that financed these deficits proved less erratic, ephemeral or 
fundamentally unsound than many had predicted – precisely because they were 
attracted by the comparative safety, liquidity and high returns that came with 
participating in American financial markets. In the current conjuncture, even as 
the American financial system is rocked by large amounts of bad debt, most key 
aspects of this framework of institutional linkages between US power and the 
world of global finance remain intact. The dollar is still unrivalled as an official 
reserve currency, as a transactions currency and as the denomination of choice 
for issues of bonds and stocks. It is the distinctive characteristic of modern 
imperialism that America’s financial problems are not just its own problems. That 
is to say, foreign investors cannot engage in a wholesale dumping of dollars on 
to the world market without destabilizing the system as a whole and doing 
serious damage to their own interests in the process.  
 
For the foreseeable future, therefore, the question is not so much how the US 
state will ward off an external threat but rather how it will manage and stabilize 
global financial markets – on behalf of domestic and foreign capital. The illiquidity 
that hit the Eurozone bond market in the wake of the US subprime credit crisis 
stands as a sharp reminder that when the US financial market sneezes, 
international financial markets still catch a cold. As for the much inflated talk that 
the Euro is about to replace the dollar as the core international currency, the 
comment of a Bank of America economist at the height of the credit crisis 
deserves to be heeded: ‘Regardless of short-term cyclical fluctuations, the long-
term demographic and economic prospects for the US economy and currency 
are better than for the eurozone. Once the dollar has hit its cyclical bottom, talk of 
the euro dethroning it will die down’.49  
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7. FINANCIAL CRISES AND POPULIST LEGITIMACY. 
 
Before the onset of the credit crisis, Robert Mundell, the Nobel economist 
laureate for his work on the relationship between capital flows, exchange rates 
and monetary policy, who is sometimes known as the ‘father of the Euro’ for his 
work on optimal currency zones, went so far, in a speech in China quoted in the 
Wall Street Journal, as to say: ‘I think the dollar era is going to last a long time . . 
.  perhaps another hundred years.’50 Whether this proves to be so will much 
depend on the capacity of the US state, which significantly hinges on the 
domestic integrity of the American financial system, and this is closely bound up 
with issues of political legitimacy. This always stands in need of continuous 
renegotiation in the US, where democratic institutions reflect and mobilize 
populist sentiments unconstrained by the more relatively autonomous 
bureaucracies of other capitalist states. This is by no means to suggest that 
American institutions allow for a greater degree of popular sovereignty than those 
in other countries. Rather, the relative openness of the American political system 
to social interests has always implied a strong need for ideological mechanisms 
of integration – and these have in turn provided a very sturdy foundation for the 
capacities of the American state. As such, legitimacy does not result in the 
restoration of a self-regulating market at the expense of state power, but rather 
enhances the capacity of the government institutions that sit at the pinnacle of 
the institutional linkages between state and society. 
 
This is quite the opposite of common notions in the political economy literature 
that the American state lacks political capacity – that it is a ‘weak state’. To the 
contrary, the American state has developed an extraordinary ability to refract 
popular discontent and misgivings and redirect them in such a way as to promote 
hegemonic integration and legitimacy. And nowhere has this been clearer than in 
the history of American finance, where a tradition of widespread suspicion vis-à-
vis the world of high finance coexists with a network of ever denser linkages 
between Main Street and Wall Street. Indeed, as Moran has argued, ‘scandal 
and crisis’ have been a crucial driving force behind regulatory change in the 
US.51 Far from buckling under the pressure of popular disapproval, financial 
elites have proved very adept at not only responding to these pressures but 
using them in such a way as to create new regulatory frameworks that have laid 
the foundations for the further growth of business. 
 
In other words, the popular protest and discontent triggered by financial scandals 
and crises, far from undermining the institutional and regulatory basis of financial 
expansion, have repeatedly been pacified through the processes of further 
‘codification, institutionalization and juridification’.52 Such scandals and crises 
have often been the object of Congressional investigations, and Congress is a 
crucial mediator in the relation between popular opinion and the regulation of the 
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financial system. ‘[T]he potential capacity to legislate, coupled with 
Congressional oversight of the executive agencies, makes the legislature a key 
place of struggle between the competing interests in the financial services 
industry’.53 This was as much the case with the establishment of the New Deal 
regulatory framework that governed the expansion of American finance from the 
1930s to the 1970s as it was in the transition to the neoliberal regulatory 
framework of our own time. The New Deal imposed a massive set of rules on 
American financial actors, but served to promote financial expansion and the 
ever deeper extension of financial relations into American life. The neoliberal era 
has seen an increase in the sheer number of rules as well as the authority of 
some key regulators, and the American state has, right up to the present day, 
proven capable of re-regulating financial dynamics when the need arose. 
 
Crisis, scandal and reregulation are more pronounced at certain times than 
others, but they are nonetheless more or less permanent, recurring features of 
American capitalism: the dynamics of financial expansion destabilize existing 
norms and practices when they penetrate into new areas of social life, and the 
resulting popular consternation becomes the occasion for reregulation. Indeed, it 
is no exaggeration to say that this dynamic became the organizing principle of a 
neoliberal regulatory regime that was increasingly pre-emptive in nature, not in 
the sense that this regime is premised on the illusion that financial crises can be 
entirely prevented, but rather in the sense that measures can be taken that may 
limit their intensity and their spread. Few crises involved such a wide swathe of 
US society as the Savings and Loans crisis, but a whole range of crises – such 
as the debt crisis, the 1987 stock market crash, the LTCM crisis and the bursting 
of the dot-com bubble – contained a clear potential for widespread instability, 
unrest and scandal. 
 
The role of Congress remained crucial in all this, especially in such major 
scandals as were revealed in the Savings and Loans crisis. But the difference 
between the political conjuncture of 1960s and 1970s and that of the 1980s and 
1990s was evident from the enhanced autonomy that government bodies other 
than Congress had acquired in addressing the problem of financial instability. 
Whereas before these actors were hamstrung by a web of New Deal regulations 
that they could do little to revise or overturn, after the neoliberal turn, and 
especially by the 1990s, they wielded their enhanced institutional capacities to 
great effect. Indeed, in cases where Congress was deemed to be unhelpful – 
such as the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, when the Treasury perceived a clear 
threat to the stability of global and American financial markets – they would even 
boldly bypass Congress without running into much trouble for doing so. 
 
To say that the neoliberal regulatory regime was increasingly pre-emptive in 
nature means that the US state had come to recognize the potentially dramatic 
consequences of a major crisis for the legitimacy of the system at large, so that 
its actions were no longer primarily determined by the anxieties that financial 
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crises induced in Members of Congress seeking re-election. But far from trying to 
contain financial expansion within specific parameters, it dedicated itself to 
constructing a regime that would exercise stabilizing effects on such accelerating 
expansion, or at least guaranteed rapid government intervention as soon as 
financial crises erupted. The Basel agreement on capital requirements was 
important here: as financial innovations had made a mockery of traditional ways 
of controlling the creation and extension of credit – notably the manipulation of 
reserve requirements by central banks – the US (in cooperation with the UK) 
promoted the attempt to create new international capital standards that would 
serve to formalize and codify risk. In addition to benefiting the US in a quite direct 
way (US Treasury bills were classified as the most liquid assets), this regime had 
the simultaneous effect of promoting financial expansion by appearing to put it on 
a more secure footing. Uncertainty was operationalized as risk and while this was 
now justified in prudential terms, it also opened up a wealth of opportunities for 
well-positioned American intermediaries.54 
 
The construction of a new international regime of capital standards was 
accompanied by the creation of a set of more flexible institutional capacities. Key 
here was the ability to marshal massive amounts of stand-by funds in a short 
period of time to reassure the market. The Treasury and Federal Reserve 
repeatedly acted to bail out financial intermediaries in trouble and this created 
expectations for the way in which monetary authorities would deal with the 
imminent failure of such intermediaries in the future. Thus, what was at least as 
important as the build-up of a set of material capacities was the 
institutionalization of a pattern of expectations that the US state would take 
responsibility for the difficulties of private financial actors. As we have said, it also 
did much to exacerbate the problem of moral hazard, which in turn reinforced the 
pursuit of financial innovation and risk and kept re-regulation on the political 
agenda. 
 
The bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001 brought an end to a decade or more 
of relatively smooth domestic financial expansion in the US. It meant a return to 
full-blown financial scandals. During the late 1990s the upper echelons of 
companies like Enron had become engaged in highly creative accounting 
practices to sustain the upward trajectory of their stock prices. With the bursting 
of the bubble, it took little time for this to be exposed: a relatively small group of 
upper-level executives had collaborated with supposedly independent auditor 
firms and analysts to engage in fraudulent bookkeeping and sustain deceptive 
stock prices of which they themselves were the prime beneficiaries. The public 
outcry was enormous and in the best tradition of American populism: the 
collusive practices of a tight-knit circle of financial elites were widely seen not as 
an outcome inherent in the logic of an empire built on capital but precisely as 
negating and undermining the virtues of hard work and free enterprise. The 
executives involved received treatments that probably had never featured in J. P. 
Morgan’s worst nightmares. Publicly named and shamed by powerful erstwhile 
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friends, they were unceremoniously prosecuted as criminals and some received 
lengthy prison sentences. 
 
In July 2002 Congress adopted the Sarbanes–Oxley bill. Its central objective was 
to make corporate governance practices more accountable and transparent to 
investors and so to secure the American public’s faith in financial markets. It 
established a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and put serious 
penalties on corporate fraud and conflicts of interest. White-collar crime was no 
longer considered an innocent, victimless crime – so was the central message. 
These measures seem to have been fairly effective, at least in the sense that, 
after the fall-out of the dot-com crash had worked its way through, the American 
financial system has not been rocked by scandals on the scale of Enron or 
WorldCom. It improved the quality of corporate reporting to investors, while only 
scratching the surface of the bountiful benefits that American financial elites can 
reap from their connections and privileged access to information. To be sure, 
American corporate and financial elites have frequently complained that 
Sarbanes–Oxley imposes unreasonable costs and restrictions and greatly 
hampers the dynamism and competitiveness of American business. While it is 
always advisable to understand the statements of the business community in 
terms of their political efficacy rather than their truth-content, such sentiments 
reflected real concerns that Sarbanes–Oxley might have stifled some of 
American finance’s traditional strengths, not least by somewhat impeding Wall 
Street’s business relative to other financial centres.55 But despite its drawbacks, 
Sarbanes–Oxley did what it was supposed to do. By addressing a concrete 
problem, it created legitimacy for the economic and financial practices that had 
given rise to those problems in the first place. 
 
The restoration of legitimacy in this classically American way – involving small 
popular gains produced through an elaborate public spectacle – reinvigorated the 
capacity of America’s key financial state institutions, allowing them to continue 
deepening and extending the reach of US financial markets. Inevitably, such 
developments gave rise to new bouts of instability and crisis. Whether the US 
state will continue to develop the institutional capacities needed to deal with 
these situations will depend on the degree of legitimacy American finance will re-
establish. And this is probably one of the most noteworthy features of the current 
crisis: even though the crisis is intimately bound up with the financial plight of 
America’s subordinate classes, the threat of mass foreclosures on mortgages is 
dealt with as a technical problem of financial management; its purely financial 
implications have been much more prominent than its social aspects. In other 
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words, legitimacy has translated into the considerable autonomy enjoyed by 
American financial authorities as they engaged in one intervention after another 
following the onset of the crisis.  
 
It is worth emphasizing here that the processes traced in this essay involve 
neither the purposeful construction of hegemonic narratives nor their conscious 
endorsement by the American public: legitimacy is an attribute of mundane, 
everyday practices and it is constructed through patterns of interaction fraught 
with unintended consequences and unacknowledged interdependencies. The 
kinds of capacities displayed by American elites and policymakers, as well as the 
high degree of responsiveness by the American public to policies designed to 
improve the operation of existing financial structures, are deeply embedded in 
intricate networks of historically evolved financial relations that are marked by a 
great deal of complexity, opacity and ambiguity. Indeed, the ideological strength 
of American institutions and symbols derives not so much from their ability to 
make a positive case for the US financial system, but rather from their tendency 
precisely to obscure the systemic properties of that system, and to divert 
attention from the exploitative qualities of the network of connections between 
state and finance in both their class and imperial dimesions. It is such institutional 
misrepresentation that makes available to financial elites the capacities for the 
pragmatic, event-driven and often contradictory manipulation of the sentiments 
expressed by ‘public opinion’ both in the US and abroad. To change this would 
require a far more radical program, informed by a far more penetrating analysis 





















Konings, Martijn and Panitch, Leo. Global finance in crisis. 
Papeles de Europa 




Arrighi, G. (2003) ‘The social and political economy of global turbulence’, New 
Left Review, II/20. 
Atkins (2007) ‘Dollar safe from challenge of the Euro’, Financial Times, 23 
November. 
Bajaj, V. and F. Fessenden (2007) ‘What’s behind the race gap’, New York 
Times, 4 November. 
Baran, Paul A. & Paul M. Sweezy (1966) Monopoly Capital: An essay on the 
American economic and social order, New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Bernanke, Ben (1983) ‘Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the 
propagation of the Great Depression’, American Economic Review, 73 
(June). 
Bernanke, Ben (2000) Essays on the Great Depression, Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Blackburn, Robin (2008) ‘The subprime crisis’, New Left Review, II/50. 
Block, Fred L. (1977) The origins of international economic disorder : a study of 
United States international monetary policy from World War II to the 
present, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Blyth, Mark (2002) Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Political 
Change in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brandeis, Louis D. (1967 [1914]) Other people’s money and how the bankers use 
it, New York: Harper & Row. 
Brenner, Robert (2003) ‘Towards the Precipice’, London Review of Books, 6 
February. 
Brinkley, A. (1995) The end of reform. New Deal liberalism in recession and war, 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Burke, M. (2001) ‘The changing nature of imperialism: the US as author of the 
Asian Crisis of 1997’, Historical Materialism, 8, 2001. 
Calder, L. (1999) Financing the American dream. A cultural history of consumer 
credit, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Chung, Joanna and Michael Mackenzie (2008) ‘SEC move on naked sellers has 
instant impact’, Financial Times, July 17. 
De Cecco, Marcello (1984) Modes of financial development: American banking 
dynamics and world financial dynamics, European University Institute 
Working Paper, No. 84/122. 
Degen, R. A. (1987) The American monetary system. A concise survey of its 
evolution since 1896, Massachutts/Toronto: D.C. Heath and 
Company/Lexington. 
Felder, R. (2008) ‘From Bretton Woods to Neoliberal Reforms: The International 
Financial Institutions and American Power’ in Martijn Konings and Leo 
Panitch (eds.) American empire and the political economy of global finance, 
New York: Palgrave. 
Garrett, G. (1998). Partisan politics in the global economy. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Konings, Martijn and Panitch, Leo. Global finance in crisis. 
Papeles de Europa 
19 (2009): 29-57 
56 
Gilpin, R. (1987) The political economy of international relations, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press;  
Germain, R. D. (1997); The International Organization of Credit: States and 
Global Finance in the World-Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Gowan, P. (1999) The global gamble, London: Verso. 
Guha, Krishna (2008) ‘Priority is to prevent crisis of liquidity’, Financial Times, 
July 15. 
Helleiner, E. (1994) States and the reemergence of global finance. From Bretton 
Woods to the 1990s, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press;  
Hilferding, R. (1981 [1910]) Finance capital. A study of the latest phase of 
capitalist development, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Kennedy, Paul M. (1987) ´The rise and fall of the great powers: economic 
change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York: Random House 
Konings, M. (2008a) ‘American finance and empire in historical perspective’, in 
Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings and (eds.), American finance and the 
political economy of global finance, New York: Palgrave. 
Konings, M. (2008b) ‘The Institutional Foundations of US Structural Power in 
International Finance: From the Re-emergence of Global Finance to the 
Monetarist Turn’, Review of International Political Economy, 15 (1), 2008. 
Konings, M. (2009) ‘The construction of US financial power’, Review of 
International Studies, 35 (1). 
Lacher, H. (1999) ‘Embedded Liberalism, Disembedded Markets: 
Reconceptualising the Pax Americana’, New Political Economy, 4 (3). 
Livingston, J. (1986) Origins of the Federal Reserve System. Money, class and 
corporate capitalism, 1890-1913, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. 
Lütz, S. (2002) Der Staat und die Globalisierung von Finanzmärkten, Regulative 
Politik in Deutschland, Grossbritannien and den USA, Frankfurt/New York: 
Campus Verlag. 
Lyons, M. N (1998) ‘Business conflict and right-wing movements’, in A. E. Ansell, 
ed., Unraveling the Right. The new conservatism in American thought and 
politics, Boulder/Oxford: Westview. 
Marglin, Stephen A. and Juliet B. Schor (1992) The Golden Age of Capitalism. 
Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Melamed, Leo (1992) Leo Melamed on the markets: twenty years of financial 
history as seen by the man who revolutionized the markets, New York: 
Wiley. 
Moran M. (1991) ´The politics of the financial services revolution: the USA, UK 
and Japan, New York: MacMillan. 
Myers, M. G. (1931) The New York money market, New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Newstadt, E. (2008) ‘Neo-Liberalism and the Federal Reserve’, in Martijn 
Konings and Leo Panitch (eds.) American empire and the political economy 
of global finance, New York: Palgrave. 
Panitch, Leo (2000) ‘The New Imperial State’, New Left Review II/2. 
Konings, Martijn and Panitch, Leo. Global finance in crisis. 
Papeles de Europa 
19 (2009): 29-57 
57 
Panitch, Leo and Sam Gindin (2004) ‘Global capitalism and American empire’, in 
L. Panitch and C. Leys, eds., The New Imperial Challenge. Socialist 
Register 2004, London: Merlin. 
Panitch, Leo and Sam Gindin (2005) ‘Superintending global capital’, New Left 
Review, II/35. 
Panitch, Leo and Sam Gindin (2008) ‘Finance and American Empire’, in Martijn 
Konings and Leo Panitch (eds.) American empire and the political economy 
of global finance, New York: Palgrave. 
Polanyi, Karl (1957) The great transformation, Boston: Beacon Press;  
Roy, W. G. (1997) Socializing capital. The rise of the large industrial corporation 
in America, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Rubin, R. (2003) In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Washington to Wall 
Street, New York. 
Rude, C. (2008) ‘The Role of Financial Discipline in Imperial Strategy’, in Martijn 
Konings and Leo Panitch (eds.) American empire and the political economy 
of global finance, New York: Palgrave. 
Ruggie, J. (1982) ‘International regimes, transactions and change: embedded 
liberalism in the post-war economic order’, International Organization, 36. 
Sarai, D. (2008) ‘US structural power and the internationalization of the Treasury, 
in Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings (eds.), American empire and the political 
economy of global finance, New York: Palgrave. 
Seabrooke, L. (2001) U.S. Power in International Finance: the victory of 
dividends, New York: Palgrave. 
Seligman, J. (2003) The transformation of Wall Street. A history of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and modern corporate finance, New York: 
Aspen Publishers. 
Sklar, M. J. (1988) The corporate reconstruction of American capitalism, 1890-
1916, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Walter, Andrew (1993) World Power andWorld Money: The Role of Hegemony 
and International Monetary Order, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf;  
Wang, Jessica (2005) ‘Imagining The Administrative State: Legal Pragmatism, 
Securities Regulation, And New Deal Liberalism’, Journal Of Policy History, 
17(3) 
Youngman, A. (1906) ‘The growth of financial banking’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 14 (7). 
